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GEORGE DESSION
RICHARD C. DONNELLY
The author is Professor of Law at the Yale Law School where he has been a member
of the faculty since 1950. He participated with the late George H. Dession in giving
various courses and seminars in criminal law and criminology. Fiom 1948 to 1950 he
taught at the University of Virginia Law School. His main teaching interests are Criminal Law and Evidence and he has published numerous articles in legal periodicals
in these ficlds.-EIroR.

When George Dession died tragically young on June 17, 1955, criminal law and
criminology lost a keen and creative scholar.
One of his greatest traits was the zeal with which he identified with the important
problems in his chosen field. Upon graduation from the Yale Law School in February,
1930, he was persuaded to fill a vacancy in criminal law. To prepare himself for this
task he first took a position in the State's Attorney's office to learn something of
the problems and role of the prosecutor. Then, in the fall of 1930, by special arrangement with the Yale Medical School, he enrolled for advanced work in anatomy,
psychiatry, and psychology. Thus began a fruitful collaboration which continued
throughout his life. Even in his first year of teaching he joined with a psychiatrist
and a member of the law faculty in giving a seminar in the legal, psychiatric, and
psychological aspects of crime.'
In 1932 he spent a year abroad as a Social Science Fellow studying the administration of the criminal law in France and Belgium. Several years later he studied
along similar lines in Italy and England as a Guggenheim Fellow.
He retained the diversity and breadth of interest thus engendered throughout
his life, collaborating steadily with his colleagues of the Medical School and other
departments of the university in courses, seminars, and articles which always transcended departmental lines. 2 He exemplified in his own person the interdisciplinary
training so many others have advocated.
Still he was no cloistered scholar. He gave himself generously to the public service.
He was a trustee of a state mental hospital for many years and a member of the New
Haven City Commission on Legal Aid. He held various positions with the Federal
3
Government for many years and was an effective prosecutor in antitrust cases.
He rendered important service as a member of the Supreme Court's Advisory Corn1 A by-product of this seminar appeared six years later in his path-breaking article entitled Psy-

chiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319 (1938).
As an example see DESSiON & AssociArEs, Drug-Induced Reelation and Criminal Investigation,
62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953), the collaborative effort of two law teachers and two psychiatrists. And see
current article in YALE LAw J. with LASSWELL.
3One result was the valuable and informing monograph on The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L.J. 1019, 1243 (1949).
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mittee on Rules of Criminal Procedure-a service marked by a sensitive concern
for the accused.'
The results of this broad and varied experience are apparent in his writings and
in his original teaching tool, his provocative materials on Criminal Law, Administration and Public Order published in 1948. 5 It is perhaps too soon to appraise the full
impact of his work upon basic criminal law theory. Indeed, his greatest contribution
was to his colleagues and students for his mind wag a veritable cornucopia of stimulating ideas. But two themes permeated his work. First, an effort to develop a
comprehensive and conceptual framework within which inquiry into community
responses to nonconforming individuals may fruitfully proceed. Second, a passionate
concern for the dignity of the individual including the "criminal" whom he called
"the low man on the social totem pole and as such the most eligible scapegoat."
He was never satisfied with the conventional distinction between criminal proceedings in general and those deemed to present special issues of civil liberties. He doubted
that arbitrariness could be tolerated in the first and successfully opposed in the
other.
I shall attempt to summarize the state of his thinking regarding the first of these
themes.'
Law is concerned with public order. It refers to the pattern or cluster of institutional arrangements which are backed with community force and exercisable through
formally authorized community agencies. The "criminal law" is charged with the
delicate role of coping with those deviational acts, personalities and conditions
considered so destructive of community values as to require drastic intervention
in the name of the community as a whole. Deviation is not synonymous with "crime."
The "criminal law" is concerned with all deviation which, if not responded to by
recourse to a sanction-equivalent such as a welfare program to prevent it or a positive sanction such as the offer of a reward or incentive to do otherwise, touches off
severe negative (value depriving) sanctioning of the deviate.
Deviation sometimes refers to a large continuing complex of past events, e.g. a
public nuisance condition such as a slum, a house of ill-fame, or a home in which
children are reared without parental affection or example conforming to the mores
of the community. It sometimes refers to a smaller complex of past events, e.g. a
deviant personality such as a psychotic or a sex offender. It sometimes refers to a
4See DESSION, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 55 YALE L.J. 694 (1946), 56 id.
197 (1947): also The Proposed FederalRules of Criminal Procedure,18 CoNiN. B.J. 58 (1944).
SSee also, DEssIoN & COHEN, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687
(1932); DESSION, From Indictment to Information-Implicationsof the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163 (1932);
DEssioN, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration, 53
YALE L.J. 684 (1944); DEssIoN, J1ustice After Conviction, 25 CONN. B.J. 215 (1951); DESSiON, The
Gowers Report and CapitalPunishment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061 (1954).
The articles cited in these footnotes are but a sampling of the product of Professor Dession's
versatile pen. He was a prolific and effective author and was much sought after as a reviewer for the
various law journals.
6 For detailed statements of his position see DESSlON, The Technique of Public Order. Evolving
Concepts of Criminal Law, in the forthcoming issue of the UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALo LAW REVIEW;
DEssiON, Deviation and Community Sanctions in PSYCHIATRY AND TIE LAW (Hocii & ZiUBIN ed.
1955); Book Review, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1477 (1955).
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single deviant overt act. Three very different foci of attention are reflected in this
three way classification of deviation. Each implies quite different types of response.
The first raises the question: What condition should be abated? The second: What
individual or personality should be reconstructed or isolated? The third: What act
should be prohibited and what deprivation prescribed for the offender? The focus
of the traditional criminal law is upon the third. Furthermore, this emphasis still
characterizes "criminal" as distinrguished from "civil" law insofar as there remains
an articulable constitutional and jurisprudential difference. The difference between
the questions asked with respect to each of the classifications sharpens when it is
considered that a deviational act may not be symptomatic of a deviational personality, as in the case of an accidental or situational offender, and that a dangerously deviant personality may exhibit no tendency to overt aggression prior to
his ultimate explosion into violence.
A functional-developmental rather than a symptomatic classification of offenders
is desirable. This puts the focus on career lines of behavior likely to produce a variety
of public order problems in a variety of situations. It is more useful for purposes of
exploring the responses of individuals to personality and culture factors of the kind
usually considered in studies of delinquency and crime causation. It also appears
more promising as a basis of inquiry into both the etiology of deviation and the
manipulative possibilities of various kinds of sanctions. An "arsonist," for example,
is a symptomatic classification. But he may represent any one of several quite unrelated clinical patterns and may even be essentially a sex offender. For purposes
of this line of inquiry a tentative classification of personality types or offenders was
devised: The paranoid, the psychopath (character neurotic), the incapacitated
(physically or mentally), the neurotic, the addict (usually also neurotic), the unintended provocateur (victim proneness), and the ideational offender (whether
white-collar, religious, or political).
Such a classification of deviates is important for several reasons. First of all, all
of these personality types are found not only among overt offenders but also among
non-offenders. Of the latter, some may be reacted to and treated as mentally ill
while others may continue as components of the general population. A recognition
that these various personality types will respond quite differently to a given type of
sanction is suggestive for the legal and administrative classification of offenders and
the sentencing function. A recognition that a similar diversity of types is to be found
in the general population is likewise suggestive in terms of the responses of third
parties to the type of sanction prescribed for or imposed in a given case-the operation and effectiveness of "deterrents", for example.
Who are the deviates and how, consistently with community values, should
they be treated? Against what hazards should they be protected? The focus is on
persons charged with crime. But the "accused" in the world of today may be proceeded against in any one of a great variety of judicial, legislative, or administrative
proceedings. Consequently, functional analysis requires an enlargement of the legal
concept of crime. Developments in American law have rendered the traditional
distinction between "criminal" and certain "civil" proceedings increasingly technical and, indeed, artificial. Some examples of sanctions which are, in fact, of a
severely negative character but yet not classed as "criminal" are as follows: The
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denaturalization of naturalized citizens; the deportation of aliens; the stigmatizing
and exclusion from public employment of persons whose loyalty is found to be
suspect in an administrative hearing; proceedings under anti-trust laws wherein
such relief as dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture is sought; and many others
in the licensing field. And, under recent legislation in a number of jurisdictions, one
may be committed for an indefinite period to a penal or hospital type institution on
diagnosis and adjudication as a "psychopathic sex offender" even though 1e may
have committed no offense for which he could be imprisoned for more than a short
term or, under some of the statutes, no offense at all. These statutes are justified as
mere extensions of preventive and welfare concepts on which such familiar procedures as the commitment of the mentally ill or defective, the quarantine of carriers
of contagious diseases, and the juvenile court commitment of delinquent and neglected
children, are based. Nevertheless, negative sanctions of a severe nature are frequently imposed even though a "welfare" approach has been substituted for a
punitive one. Should not the safeguards of a criminal proceeding be applied to the
above situations? If not, what scheme of values should govern decisions of the
kind involved and what sorts of persons should have the power of decision? If tile
welfare approach is desirable and if a scheme of values consistent with public order
preferences can be devised, should it not be extended to other areas now embraced
by the traditional criminal law?
In addition to the proceedings other than "criminal" that involve severe sanctions,
what of the many private groups and organizations that wield more or less unchallenged coercive power over individuals? Here too, those against whom severe "social"
negative sanctions-are invoked should be included as deviates if a study of tile
sanctioning process is to be meaningful.
The special attribute of negative sanctioning behavior is that it consists in the
infliction of value deprivation for the purpose of achieving a net value gain. Negative
sanctions must, therefore, be appraised as instruments of total policy. Their use
is adaptive when there is a demonstrable contribution to a net gain in the value
position of the community. A democratic society is committed to placing a prime
value on the individual, "any individual, be he citizen or alien, useful or harmful,
sane or mad." This does not mean, of course, that a deviate may not be sanctioned
under appropriate circumstances. It does mean that he will be sanctioned only in
accordance with the values of the community. These values require that certain
principles govern the imposition of sanctions.
First, no prescription will be favored which is not essential to the establishment
or reinforcement of institutional patterns that facilitate the full self-realization of all
individuals. This is the Equality principle.
Second, punishment is never good in itself. Rehabilitation, deterrence, and prevention or incapacitation may be put forth as worthy objectives of the criminal law
with some hope of eliciting wide agreement. But this is no longer true of punishment.
The inference is that non-depriving ways of coping with deviation, e.g., sanctionequivalents, will be employed where available and adequate. Where not available
and adequate the preference is for less, as against more, depriving sanctions. This is
the Economy principle.
Third, the power of decision in matters of sanctioning should be as widely as
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possible, rather than narrowly, shared. This preference for wide decision rests on the
belief that the knowledge of any particular individual, elite or expert group, or
even whole culture, is too relative to warrant the unrestrained imposition of value
judgments on others. This is the Democratic principle.
Fourth, with respect to the appropriate unit of identification, whether for resolving problems of conflicting loyalty or for defining the community to be benefited
as a whole by a given sanctioning response, the preference should be for the largest
possible identification consistent with freedom of a given national community from
external dictation or from a minority-imposed internal structural change. This is
the Humanitarian principle.
At the time of his death, George Dession was busy translating the postulates and
principles I have described into concrete expression in the form of a Correctional
Code for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. It is an irretrievable loss to criminal
law and criminology that he was stricken before this herculean task was finished.

